What To Know About Interim Licenses In Global FRAND Cases

Interim licenses are emerging as a novel remedy in global standard essential patent (SEP) disputes, offering parties a way to operate on temporary fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms while courts determine final license conditions. In this Law360 article, Fish & Richardson attorneys Matthew Mosteller and Eli Svetlov examine how UK courts have shaped the practice, the impact of recent decisions from the Unified Patent Court, and the practical considerations for SEP owners and implementers. Their analysis highlights the evolving landscape of interim licensing and provides strategic insights for navigating complex, multi-jurisdictional FRAND litigation.

Read the full article for a closer look at the opportunities and challenges presented by interim licenses in today’s global patent environment.

This article was originally published on October 28, 2025, on Law360: What To Know About Interim Licenses In Global FRAND Cases - Law360

Read the full article: What To Know About Interim Licenses In Global FRAND Cases

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What to Know About Interim Licenses in Global FRAND Cases 

Interim licenses are a developing remedy in global standard essential patent (SEP) disputes — most visibly in the United Kingdom — under which parties operate on temporary fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms while a court determines the final FRAND terms. They can benefit both SEP owners and implementers and, in cases where there is no immediate risk of injunction, may provide a more practical and effective alternative to traditional measures like temporary restraining orders (TROs) or anti-suit injunctions (ASIs). But the future of interim licenses is in doubt following the Unified Patent Court’s (UPC) recent decision in Interdigital v. Amazon, which issued the first “anti-interim license injunction” and rejected the legitimacy of UK-based interim licenses covering European patents. Their availability remains highly fact-specific, depending on factors such as the scale, geography, and timing of the litigation. 

What is an interim license?  

In SEP disputes, an interim license is a temporary patent license that allows an implementer to continue using the patented technology and selling the accused products while the final FRAND terms are determined. As the UK Court of Appeal put it, the aim of an interim license is to “hold the ring” between the parties until the license terms are finally settled¹. 

Interim licenses remain rare and are not part of routine SEP litigation practice. Courts have treated them as exceptional relief, generally reserved for situations where the parties show willingness to take a license on whatever FRAND terms the court ultimately sets. Recent developments have also shown that courts are hesitant to grant interim licenses when doing so would impact patent rights in other jurisdictions, or to endorse interim licenses that would impede on their own jurisdiction.  

How interim licenses took shape 

The UK is currently the leading venue for global FRAND rate-setting after Unwired Planet v. Huawei,² in which the UK Supreme Court confirmed jurisdiction to set worldwide FRAND terms in appropriate cases. Building on that foundation, recent UK Court of Appeal decisions have shaped the framework for interim licenses. 

In the 2024 landmark decision Panasonic v. Xiaomi, the UK Court of Appeal held that an SEP holder must grant an interim global license to an implementer while the UK court determined the FRAND terms, effectively establishing global interim licenses as a remedy.³ The court identified provisional terms for the interim license and found that Panasonic (the SEP holder) had acted in bad faith by pursuing injunctions abroad after invoking the UK’s jurisdiction to set global FRAND terms.⁴  

The reasoning in Panasonic v. Xiaomi was subsequently applied in other cases. In Alcatel v. Amazon, the UK Court of Appeal allowed Amazon to amend its pleadings to seek an expedited interim license from Nokia in a global dispute over “RAND” terms.^5,6  

In Lenovo v. Ericsson, the UK Court of Appeal clarified the principles governing interim licenses and confirmed that whether an interim license is appropriate relief is fact-dependent.⁷ The court framed the inquiry around four recurring issues — good faith, FRAND-compliant terms, useful purpose, and comity — and again permitted an interim license where it would meaningfully advance resolution without intruding on foreign courts.⁸ 

Most recently, Samsung v. ZTE became the first decision of a UK first-instance court to apply the interim-license framework post-Panasonic and Lenovo.⁹ Both parties were willing to enter an interim license but disagreed on forum: Samsung proposed the UK court, while ZTE insisted that a Chinese court should determine the final FRAND terms.¹⁰ The UK Patents Court granted declarations for an interim license, concluding that a willing licensor in ZTE’s position would proceed with a FRAND determination from the UK court, especially where it had been first to assume jurisdiction.¹¹ 

Outside the UK, interim-license practice remains largely undeveloped. In the United States, early cases suggest courts are still in an experimental phase. For example, in Netgear v. Huawei, Netgear sought an anti-enforcement injunction or, alternatively, an interim global license from the U.S. court, along with an injunction of Huawei’s foreign cases against Netgear. In response, Huawei sought and received anti-anti-suit injunctions (AASIs) from Chinese and German Courts, as well as the Unified Patent Court, each of which was presiding over parallel litigation between the parties. The parties reached a global settlement shortly after those AASIs issued, before the U.S. court could rule on the interim license request.¹² More recently, in Roku v. Access Advance, Roku sought an interim license as alternative relief, but the court declined to address it, holding it lacked jurisdiction to set a global pool FRAND rate and that any such determination could only be advisory.¹³ Other courts are likewise unsettled.  

The UPC has yet to set a global FRAND rate, and early indicators suggest it is more likely to follow the German approach — adjudicating FRAND defenses without itself setting global rates — than to adopt the UK model of global rate-setting. For example, in its December 18, 2024, decision in Huawei v. Netgear, UPC_CFI_9/2023, the Munich Local Division (LD) rejected Netgear’s FRAND defense. In doing so, the Munch LD applied a more flexible, SEP holder-friendly approach to the European Commission’s Huawei v. ZTE framework, consistent with the decisions of the German national courts.  

The UPC has also rejected the legitimacy of interim licenses sought from the UK courts. In its September 30, 2025, decision in InterDigital v. Amazon, UPC_CFI_936/2025, the Mannheim LD issued a first-of-its-kind “anti-interim license injunction,” finding that Amazon’s request to the UK High Court for an interim license covering European patents would usurp the jurisdiction of the UPC by depriving the patentee of its ability to enforce those patents. The court likewise barred any related requests for an ASI, TRO, or declaration that SEP holder InterDigital had breached its RAND obligations. Amazon now has an opportunity to appeal that decision. On October 20, 2025, the UK High Court responded to the UPC by issuing its own ex parte AASI enjoining InterDigital from seeking further injunctions of the relief sought by Amazon in the UK High Court, without displacing the UPC’s anti-interim license injunction.¹⁴The UK High Court also set an expedited hearing for October 30, 2025, to address this and other issues raised by the parties. 

When to consider seeking interim licenses  

In global disputes — particularly where there is no immediate risk of injunction — seeking a single interim license can be more efficient and cost-effective than pursuing serial TROs or ASIs across multiple jurisdictions. Courts are often reluctant to grant TROs or ASIs, especially where implementers struggle to establish irreparable harm or likelihood of success. From a business standpoint, a defined interim FRAND license is often preferable to prolonged litigation uncertainty. However, recent developments may limit the viability of interim licenses as a remedy moving forward.  

Still, for implementers, an interim FRAND license can be a practical means of keeping products on the market and maintaining business continuity with greater cash-flow certainty, particularly where TROs pose a risk. For SEP owners, interim licensing provides a mechanism to begin monetizing portfolios sooner, easing the pressure to seek injunctions in multiple parallel proceedings. 

UK courts have emphasized that interim SEP licenses are less intrusive than TROs or ASIs and are intended to streamline disputes without requiring either side to abandon its arguments on FRAND obligations.¹⁵ In practice, interim licenses often pave the road toward a global settlement.¹⁶ 

Offering or accepting an interim license also demonstrates willingness to license, thereby strengthening a party’s posture under traditional FRAND analysis. Conversely, refusing to accept an interim license — even while negotiations are ongoing — may be viewed as evidence of bad faith. 

Still, there are important trade-offs to consider. A provisional licensing rate can anchor expectations and shape the eventual FRAND outcome, for better or worse. Court-imposed interim terms may also fail to satisfy either side. Moreover, committing to interim rights diminishes the SEP-holder’s leverage that comes from the threat of an injunction. 

When not to seek interim licenses 

Traditional TROs and ASIs may be preferable to interim licenses in a range of scenarios. When an implementer is faced with an imminent enforcement risk — such as an exclusion order, injunction, or customs seizure — pursuing an interim FRAND license is likely too slow and too uncertain. In those circumstances, a TRO or ASI may be better suited to preserve shipments and sales in a particular jurisdiction while the parties continue litigating or negotiating FRAND or contract issues. 

TROs may also be advisable where global resolution of a SEP/FRAND dispute is unnecessary. For instance, an interim license may be sub-optimal where issues in parallel lawsuits do not overlap enough to justify a global interim license. And the UPC’s recent Amazon decision may limit the availability of an interim license when European patents are at issue.  

An ASI is likewise the more effective tool for implementers when a counterparty has filed, or threatened to file, in an injunction-friendly venue to gain leverage. An AASI, if an ASI has already been obtained abroad, may protect jurisdiction over FRAND or contract claims and avoid inconsistent rulings. 

Companies should also consider ASIs when an SEP owner targets downstream customers in an effort to gain leverage for settlement. In such situations, an ASI can halt indirect enforcement actions and centralize the dispute on the underlying FRAND issues. 

 Finally, interim licensing should be weighed in light of the timing and development of parallel litigation. Outside the UK, courts have shown little appetite for imposing interim licenses, and UK rulings on interim licensing may be difficult to enforce elsewhere. Recent practice in Germany and the UPC, for example, has been openly skeptical of UK interim-license decisions in domestic injunction cases and has expressly rejected their force in German and European SEP infringement actions.^17,18  

Takeaways 

Along with TROs and ASIs, interim licenses have emerged as a novel but still exceptional tool in global SEP/FRAND disputes, particularly in the UK, where courts have taken the lead in shaping the practice. They can preserve market access for implementers and provide early monetization for SEP owners while also signaling good faith in licensing negotiations. Particularly where immediate injunction risks are not present, interim licenses can help streamline complex disputes and facilitate global settlements. Yet, recent German and UPC decisions threaten the availability of interim licenses as a remedy in global SEP disputes.